

## Message Text

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ACTION NEA-09

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-03 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00 INR-07

NSAE-00 PRS-01 SAM-01 EB-07 SAJ-01 EUR-12 IGA-01 AF-06

EA-06 L-02 /079 W

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R 221515Z APR 75

FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 994

SECDEF WASHDC

JCS WASHDC

INFO CHUSMTM DHAHRAN SAUDI ARABIA

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

DIA WASHDC

AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 JIDDA 2837

EWTO. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR, US, SA, OVIP (CLEMENTS, WILLIAM)

SUBJECT: DEPSECDEF CLEMENTS AND CJCS GENERAL BROWN VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA

SUMMARY: THE VISIT BY DEPSECDEF CLEMENTS AND CJCS GENERAL BROWN TO SAUDI ARABIA APRIL 13-17 WAS OF SIGNIFICANT BENEFIT TO US-SAUDI RELATIONSHIP AND TO THE FURTHERANCE OF US ADVISORY AND ASSISTANCE IN COUNTRY. THE SECRETARY AND GENERAL BROWN MET WITH THE KING AND MAJOR PRINCES, AND CONCURRENTLY SAUDI-US WORKING LEVEL MEETINGS WERE HELD TO RESOLVE SPECIFIC PROBLEMS. END SUMMARY.

1. THE VISIT BY SECRETARY CLEMENTS AND GENERAL BROWN TO SAUDI ARABIA PROVED TO BE OF SIGNIFICANT BENEFIT TO THE US DEFENSE EFFORT IN SAUDI ARABIA. THE SECRETARY AND GENERAL BROWN COMMENCED THEIR VISIT IN JIDDA ON APRIL 13, WHERE THEY MET WITH EMBASSY OFFICERS, AND CHIEF, USMTM, THE DISTRICT ENGINEER AND THE PROJECT MANAGER OF THE SAUDI NATIONAL GUARD MODERNIZATION PROGRAM (SANG). THE FOLLOWING DAY THEY FLEW TO RIYADH AND MET WITH KING KHALID, AND PRINCES FAHD, ABDULLAH, SULTAN, AND TURKI. CONCURRENTLY, WORKING LEVEL MEETINGS

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WITH US ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE REPRESENTATIVE WERE HELD WITH THEIR

SAUDI COUNTERPARTS TO WORK OUT ASSISTANCE PROBLEMS. ON APRIL 15, GENERAL BROWN RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES, AND THE NEXT DAY SECRETARY CLEMENTS TRAVELLED TO THE DHAHRAN-DAMMAM AREA TO VISIT THE SAUDI NAVY AND TOUR THE PORT AT DAMMAM.

2. THE KING AND SENIOR PRINCES TOOK THE VISIT AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO EMPHASIZE FOUR POINTS:

A. THEIR DESIRE FOR AN EVEN CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US IN THE FUTURE, INCLUDING GREATER US INVOLVEMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA, ECONOMICALLY AND MILITARILY, AND CLOSER COOPERATION IN DEALING WITH REGIONAL ISSUES SUCH AS AID TO THE YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC AND LESSENING THE INVOLVEMENT OF EGYPT, IRAQ, AND THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF SOUTH YEMEN WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

B. THE DETERMINATION OF SAUDI ARABIA TO BUILD UP ITS ARMED FORCES TO EQUAL OR EXCEED THE STRENGTH OF THOSE OF ITS NEIGHBORING ARAB STATES. PRINCE FAHD AND PRINCE SULTAN BOTH REFERRED TO THIS POINT SEVERAL TIMES AND EMPHASIZED THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAD NO AGGRESSIVE

INTENTIONS, BUT WANTED A STRONG DETERRENT TO ANY COUNTRY WHICH MIGHT BE TEMPTED TOWARD AGGRESSION AGAINST SAUDI ARABIA. PRINCE FAHD STATED THAT IN THE FUTURE SAUDI ARABIA WOULD LOOK TO THE US FOR ALL ITS MILITARY AID, AND ALL THOSE VISITED EMPHASIZED THE URGENCY OF GREATER SPEED IN BUILDING THEIR ARMED FORCES.

C. THE NEED FOR THE UNITED STATES TO CONTINUE WORKING TOWARD AN EQUITABLE PEACE SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS.

D. THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS ATTEMPTING TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE US AND SAUDI ARABIA. KING KHALID MENTIONED THAT HE HAD RECENTLY RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM SOVIET SECRETARY BREZHNEV SUGGESTING CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA AND THE USSR. BUT THAT THE KING HAD REFUSED THE OFFER.

3. THE FOLLOWING ARE SUMMARIES OF OTHER POINTS MADE BY THE KING, PRINCE FAHD, AND PRINCE SULTAN:

A. NEED FOR A POPULAR, HIGH IMPACT PROJECT:  
KING KHALID STATED THAT HE WANTED SOME MAJOR DEVELOPMENT,  
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SPONSORED BY THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR, TO REWARD THE PEOPLE FOR THEIR LOYALTY AND AFFECTION TO THE ROYAL FAMILY, TO SHOW THEM THAT EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP HAD NOT ENDED WITH THE DEATH OF KING FAISAL, AND TO COUNTER RUMORS BEING SPREAD THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN FAISAL'S ASSASSINATION. HE THOUGHT THIS MIGHT TAKE THE FORM OF ACCELERATED MILITARY TRAINING, THE OPENING OF NEW HOSPITALS AND/OR THE RAPID CONSTRUCTION OF HOUSING. THE SECRETARY ASSURED HIM THE US WOULD DO ALL POSSIBLE TO ASSIST.

B. SAG AND ITS RADICAL NEIGHBORS:

PRINCE FAHD STATED IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION BY SECRETARY CLEMENTS CONCERNING THE RECENT SETTLEMENT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN THAT HE HAD PERSONALLY WORKED DURING THE ALGIERS MEETINGS TO BRING THE COUNTRIES TOGETHER AND THAT THE SETTLEMENT SHOULD PROVE BENEFICIAL TO THE GLF REGION. HE SAID HE BELIEVES THAT IRAQ PLACES GOOD RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA AT THE TOP OF ITS PRIORITY LIST. HE ADDED THAT TO ACHIEVE THIS, IRAQ WILL HAVE TO BE VERY CAREFUL AND MAKE CERTAIN ITS RELATIONS ARE GOOD WITH SAUDI FRIENDS IN THE GULF. AS TO SOUTH YEMEN, PRINCE FAHD STATED THAT SAUDI ARABIA WOULD TAKE NO ACTION AGAINST THE PDYR PROVIDING THAT COUNTRY "DOESN'T MAKE TROUBLE." EITHER FOR SAUDI ARABIA OR FOR OTHER ARAB STATES, ADDING, HOWEVER, THAT SAUDI ARABIA WAS DOING ALL IT COULD TO SEPARATE SOUTH YEMEN FROM THE USSR. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE COMMENTED THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD SAUDI ARABIA ALLOW SOUTH YEMEN TO PROVIDE NAVAL PRIVILEGES OR BASES TO THE USSR. PRINCE SULTAN STATED THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO ACT AGAINST SOUTH YEMEN BECAUSE SUCH ACTION COULD GIVE SAUDI ARABIA'S ENEMIES AMMUNITION TO ATTACK THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT, BUT THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAD PAID EGYPT \$20 MILLION TO OCCUPY PERIM ISLAND. TURNING TO SOMALIA, PRINCE FAHD SAID THAT HE CONSIDERED THE SOVIET BUILD-UP VERY DANGEROUS AND THAT THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT WAS "DEEPLY CONCERNED" ABOUT IT.

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C. PRINCE SULTAN SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD ALSO SET UP A YEMEN ASSISTANCE OFFICE TO AID THE YAR, AND WOULD SEEK US COOPERATION IN DEVELOPING THE YAR ECONOMICALLY, MILITARILY AND SOCIALLY. HE SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH THE US AMBASSADOR IN MID-MAY TO WORK OUT WHAT BOTH SAUDI ARABIA AND THE US COULD CONTRIBUTE.

4. PRINCE TURKI DEVOTED MOST OF HIS COMMENTS TO THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE ASPECT OF THE SECRETARY'S AND GENERAL BROWN'S VISIT, AND CITED A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS HE OBVIOUSLY CONSIDERED CHRONIC:

A. COST OVERRUNS: ESCALATION OF PRICES OF CORPS OF ENGINEER PROJECTY AND OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT. HE SAID HE COULD UNDERSTAND, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THIS PERIOD OF INFLATION, HOW PRICES COULD GO UP 20 OR EVEN 30 PERCENT IN THIS AREAS, BUT NOT 300 PERCENT OR MORE AS IN THE ESTIMATES FOR THE AIR DEFENSE SCHOOL, AND SAUDI NAVAL EXPANSION PROGRAM.

B. LONG LEAD TIMES AND DELAYS IN RECEIVING EQUIPMENT.

C. THE FAILURE, IN HIS TERMS, OF DOD TO RESPOND TO  
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REQUEST FROM MODA FOR THE TOW MISSILE SYSTEM.

D. THE APPARENT INAVILITY OF THE US TO PROVIDE MODERN LAND MINELAYING AND SWEEPING EQUIPMENT.

5. PRINCE ABDULLAH FIRST RAISED TWO POLITICAL QUESTIONS OF CONCERN TO HIM AND THEN BROUGHT OUT A LETTER DISCUSSING FOUR PROBLEM AREAS IN THE NATIONAL GUARD MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

A. STAMINA OF US AS AN ALLY:  
SPEAKING FRANKLY, HE SAID, AS A FRIEND, HE AND THE PEOPLE OF SAUDI ARABIA WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE RESOLUTENESS OF THE UNITED STATES TO SUPPORT ITS ALLIES WHEN THEY WERE UNDER ATTACK. HE BLAMED THE US CONGRESS, WHICH HE SAID DID NOT REPRESENT THE WILL OF THE MAJORITY OF AMERICANS, AND CITED THE CASES OF PAKISTAN AND SOUTH VIETNAM. SECRETARY CLEMENTS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE US HAD MADE ERRORS IN ITS DEALINGS WITH PAKISTAN AND THAT THESE WERE BEING RECTIFIED. AS TO SOUTH VIETNAM, THE SECRETARY MADE A FORCEFUL STATEMENT THAT, HAVING DEVOTED \$150 BILLIONS AND 55,000 AMERICAN LIVES TO BOLSTER SOUTH VIETNAM, THE US NEED APOLOGIZE TO NO ONE ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE WAR. TO THE CONTRARY, HE SAID "IN ANY FAIR EVALUATION,

NO ONE COULD HELP BUT ADMIRE OUR STAMINA". GENERAL BROWN THEN EXPLAINED THAT THE CAUSE OF THE RECENT FLIGHT OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY FROM THE COMMUNISTS WAS A GOVERNMENT ORDER TO WITHDRAW, GIVEN

BEFORE ORDERS COULD GO OUT TO THE UNITS.

B. MID-EAST: PRINCE ABDULLAH THEN COMMENTED BRIEFLY ON HIS HOPE THAT IN DEALING WITH THE MIDDLE EAST, THE UNITED STATES WOULD SEEK TO SERVE ITS OWN INTERESTS, RATHER THAN THOSE OF THE ZIONISTS.

C. SOME SPECIFIC PROBLEMS:  
THE PRINCE THEN READ A LETTER DELINEATING FOUR PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN US SUPPORT FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD. THEY WERE:

(1) CHANGES REQUIRED BY THE US GOVERNMENT IN THE VINNELL TRAINING CONTRACT TO ELIMINATE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST JEWS AND WOMEN, AND HAIRCUT RESTRICTIONS. SECRETARY CLEMENTS POINTED OUT THAT THESE WERE IN RESPONSE TO EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LAWS, AND THAT THE CHANGES HAD NO EFFECT UPON WHOM THE NATIONAL GUARD CHOSE TO EMPLOY.

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(2) RISING PRICES OF SALES CASES.

(3) THE FACT THAT THE TOURS OF ADVISORS WERE ONLY ONE YEAR IN LENGTH AND THAT LONGER TOURS WERE PREFERRED.

(4) THAT DELIVERY OF EQUIPMENT WAS TOO SLOW AND THAT HE WANTED TO CONSIDER THE US AIR FORCE AIRLIFTING IN GUARD MATERIAL.

6. ON APRIL 14, WORKING GROUPS MET WITH THEIR SAUDI COUNTERPARTS UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF LTG HOWARD M. FISH, AND THE FOLLOWING DAY, PRINCE TURKI, SECRETARY CLEMENTS AND GENERAL BROWN MET WITH THE WORKING GROUPS TO RESOLVE ANY OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS. THESE RELATED GENERALLY TO ISSUES DISCUSSED PREVIOUSLY BY PRINCE TURKI AND TO POINTS CONCERNING SPECIFIC FMS CASES. THE MEETINGS WERE FOR THE MOST PART FRANK AND OPEN AND RESULTED IN A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEEDS AND PROBLEMS OF BOTH SIDES. (SECRETARY CLEMENTS TOUCHED ON THE NEED TO RESTRUCTURE USMTM TO PROVIDE FOR SAUDI FINANCING OF ITS COSTS, AND ALSO ON PROBLEM DOD FACES IN MEETING WORLD-WIDE DEMANDS FROM US ALLIES FOR THE TOW MISSILES. THESE SUBJECTS WERE NOT DEALT WITH IN DETAIL AND THE EMBASSY MAY REQUEST THAT THE SECRETARY FURTHER PURSUE THEM AT A LATER DATE IN A LETTER TO PRINCE SULTAN.)

7. FOLLOWING THE VISIT TO THE CAPITAL, SECRETARY CLEMENTS TRAVELLED TO THE DHAHRAN AREA TO MEET WITH THE US MILITARY TRAINING MISSION AND TO TOUR SAUDI NAVY INSTALLATIONS AND THE PORT OF DAMMAM. OF MAJOR INTEREST WAS THE PORT, WHICH IS STILL UNDER DEVELOPMENT, BUT WHICH IS A BOTTLENECK IN THE SUPPLY OF SAUDI ARABIA'S EASTERN PROVINCE. THE SECRETARY WAS TOLD THAT SHIPS HAD TO WAIT WEEKS TO REACH A BERTH, THAT POOR HANDLING AND LOADING COST IMPORTERS HEAVILY IN DAMAGE, AND THAT THE AVERAGE CARGO REQUIRED 120-150 DAYS TO CLEAR CUSTOMS. THE SECRETARY DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH LTG

IBRAHIM AL-FARIS, THE ARMY AREA COMMANDER, BUT IT IS DOUBTFUL ANY  
SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT WILL BE MADE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

8. DURING THE EVENING OF APRIL 15, PRINCE FAHD AND PRINCE SULTAN  
CONTACTED THE AMBASSADOR WITH A REQUEST THAT GENERAL BROWN MAKE A  
STATEMENT TO THE PRESS DENYING RUMORS CONCERNING A US INVASION OF THE  
SAUDI OIL FIELDS. THE AMBASSADOR CONVINCED THEM THAT IT WOULD BE IN-  
APPROPRIATE FOR GENERAL BROWN TO DO SO, AND SECRETARY CLEMENTS AGREED  
TO ADDRESS THE SUBJECT THE FOLLOWING MORNING AT RIYADH AIRPORT PRIOR  
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TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR DHAHRAN. THE CIRCUMSTANCES THERE PROVED INOPPOR-

TUNE, AND SECRETARY CLEMENTS THEN MADE THE STATEMENT ON APRIL 17 AT  
DHAHRAN. IT WAS QUOTED AS FOLLOWS IN THE SAUDI PRESS: "THERE HAS  
BEEN SPECULATION ABOUT THE OIL SITUATION IN THE MXAREA AND WHETHER IT  
MIGHT CAUSE ECONOMIC STRANGULATION, BUT SUCH PURELY ECONOMIC MATTERS  
WILL BE SOLVED BY SPECIALISTS. WE IN THE UNITED STATES WOULD LIKE TO  
CONFIRM THAT THE SOLUTION FOR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS COMES THROUGH  
ECONOMIC MEANS AND UNDERSTANDING."  
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## Message Attributes

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